The following pages do not analyze why Bulgaria chose the way of ‘everything or nothing’, and who was responsible for the forthcoming events in 1913 (leaving it to the Bulgarian historians); the present study focuses on the possible solutions that might have promised a different outcome of the events including more favourable territorial consequences for Bulgaria. Our topic gains relevance from three aspects: (1) the behaviour, the tactics of the small states in the past is instructive for the present (1991–1999) and future; (2) the overestimated trust in international treaties and jurisdiction compared to crude force was also a lesson that the whole world learnt in the next decades; and from historical point of view (3) the diplomatic battle has serious consequences on the balance of Powers, especially for Austria-Hungary. The examination of the diplomatic instruments of small states, beside the experience of tactics and strategies, methods and aims (still relevant due to the events of 1991–1999 on the peninsula), is not a negligible factor. The following pages focus on the understanding and interpretation of the situation prior to the second Balkan War assessing the political reality of the possible solutions discussed by Bulgarian diplomatists. As the rupture of the Balkan League had already been analyzed, our attempt is mainly based on reports of ambassadors still unpublished and not used in research found among the archives of Sofia and Vienna. This study was supported by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.